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The world has evolved. Modern society is largely dependent on technology,
and there is a never-ending appetite for scientific development; there is often
new technology released that is making lives more convenient, and more
connected, than ever. Many Americans live in a world where every click and
internet search leaves a digital trail which can be stored and stitched together to
reveal an individual’s innermost private life.1 Current law provides minimal
privacy protection to individuals, undermining Americans’ Fourth Amendment
safeguard that many hold essential to certain individual freedoms.2 The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause.”3
The terms “unreasonable” and “reasonable” have become basic principles that
have been used to guide authority.4 However, in today’s increasingly digitally
connected world, where one has little choice but to use the internet to function,
1
Daniel Zwerdling, Your Digital Trail, and How It Can Be Used Against You, NPR
(Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/09/30/226835934/
your-digital-trail-and-how-it-can-be-used-against-you.
2
Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the ThirdParty Doctrine, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 29, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/rethinking-privacy-fourth-amendment-papers-and-third-partydoctrine.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4
Jonathan Kim, Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last updated June 2017).
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there is a concern as to what exactly is “reasonable.” This is because many smart
devices share users’ information with third parties.5 In fact, in a world where
digital technology has revolutionized the way in which Americans conduct daily
business, many feel as if an expectation of privacy no longer exists.6
This sharing of information has led to a growing privacy gap that denies
Fourth Amendment protection, more specifically the “third-party doctrine.” In a
briefing to members of Congress, the Congressional Research Service described
the third-party doctrine as follows:
In these cases, the Court held that people are not entitled to an
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to
third parties. This legal proposition, known as the third-party
doctrine, permits the government access to, as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law, a vast amount of information about individuals,
such as the websites they visit; who they have emailed; the phone
numbers they dial; and their utility, banking, and education records,
just to name a few.7
In the increasingly digital world, companies hold a plethora of information on
behalf of their customers, which these customers have voluntarily provided.8
Information that is voluntarily provided is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment; the Supreme Court has held that the information “a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”9 The doctrine has allowed the government to
access information using a standard lower than probable cause.10 This doctrine
should be reassessed to better fit into the digital age. Property law, a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and the trespass doctrine, to name a few standards of
deciding what is private, are not promising steppingstones on which to continue
to base Fourth Amendment claims.
Technological advancements and the proliferation of third-party records since

5
Lisa A. Schmidt, Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking
on Facebook, Twitter and Foursquare, 22 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 524 (2012).
6
See Scenario ONE: The New Normal, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LONG-TERM
CYBERSECURITY, https://cltc.berkeley.edu/scenario/scenario-one/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020)
(suggesting that by 2020, most of people’s information will be kept online, leaving people
vulnerable to data breaches, government intervention, and public display of sensitive
information).
7
RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT & THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE (2014).
8
Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV.
BUS. REV., May 2015, at 1, 4.
9
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
10 Margaret E. Twomey, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard
for the Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
401, 410 (2015).
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the doctrine’s inception in two Supreme Court decisions in the late 1970s11 raise
questions about the stability of this doctrine in modern society.
The way the Supreme Court has historically looked at the Fourth Amendment
is analogous to a patchwork quilt; the Supreme Court attempts to fix privacy
concerns by evaluating technological advances one-by-one rather than
considering what will come next or how one decision could impact future
technologies. Katz,12 United States v. Jones,13 and Riley v. California14 are
Supreme Court cases that exhibit this piecemeal approach.
As technology transforms the way people participate in society, the core
Fourth Amendment protection to feel secure in one’s person, home, papers, and
effects is beginning to erode. Under the third-party doctrine, the government can
obtain any information that a person has disclosed to a third party, as the doctrine
states that police do not need a warrant to search and seize consumers’ private
data on the internet.15 Instead, the government or its agents can issue a subpoena
to a third party, which is a non-governmental institution, in order to capture
desired information.16 As a result, the third-party doctrine allows the government
to circumvent Americans’ Constitutional guarantees without a warrant.17 Under
the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the privacy
of personal data held by private companies, should the government request this
information.18
In this way, the third-party doctrine acts as a general warrant as it is a blanket
request that provides the government access to vast amounts of information
retained by third-party service providers. General warrants were antithetical to
the Founders’ wishes at the founding of the country, and these wishes should be
carried through in the interpretation of privacy rights today.19
Carpenter v. United States is the most recent Supreme Court case that takes
issue with the third-party doctrine, specifically focusing on the relatively new

11 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979).
12 Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
13 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
14 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
15 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 811 (2005).
16 Id. at 805.
17 Cristina Del Rosso, Protecting Online Privacy in the Digital Age: Carpenter v. United
States and the Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine 3 (2019) (B.A. thesis, University
of Central Florida) (on file with the University of Central Florida libraries).
18 Slobogin, supra note 15, at 811.
19 See generally Lee Arbetman & Michelle Perry, Search and Seizure: The Meaning of
the Fourth Amendment Today, SOCIALSTUDIES, http://www.socialstudies.org/sites/default/
files/publications/se/6105/610507.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2020) (discussing the history of
the Fourth Amendment and how it applies to society today).
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issue of how to treat cell-site location information (“CSLI”).20 In writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts opined that Carpenter was a narrow ruling that
left existing precedent undisturbed and would not require law enforcement, in
most cases, to obtain a warrant when seeking information held by third-party
companies.21 However, because the ruling was limited in only applying to CSLI,
the parameters of this new-found protection remain unclear.
Society must reevaluate the third-party doctrine and the way it impacts lives
both now and in the future, especially as it relates to emerging technology. This
article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focused on the third-party doctrine and
twenty-first century technology in order to examine how the current path for
privacy rights is destined to fail. The second section examines how the current
understanding of the doctrine applies to certain digital information like the
information in Carpenter. The third section considers specific types of
technology that store consumers’ data and how the privacy they voluntarily
share can be used against them in this digital age, particularly, how digital
technologies threaten to exclude immeasurable quantities of personal
information from Fourth Amendment protection. The final section offers a
review of current theories of privacy and suggestions on how to proceed.
I. THE LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
To discuss the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, a review of its origins and history is imperative. The first
clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,
while the second clause specifically bans the use of “general warrants.”22
The Warrant Clause, which is understood to be the second clause of the text,
is thought to regulate warrant authority.23 This clause is believed to ban the use
of “general warrants,” which are blanket warrants that can be obtained without
an “adequate showing of cause.”24 They “allowed officers to search wherever
they wanted and to seize whatever they wanted, with few exceptions.”25
The Founding Fathers “sought to prevent unjustified searches” from
occurring in the first place;26 regardless of location, the Founders desired

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
Id. at 2220.
22 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 551 (1999).
23 Id. at 558.
24 Id.
25 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 153 (1999).
26 Id. at 576.
20
21
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protections for personal items.27 Moreover, unlike the real property discussed in
the text of the Amendment, effects could be carted away by the government.28
The Founders did not seek a post-intrusion remedy; instead they implemented a
deterrent to the government issuance of a nonspecific warrant.29 Should an
officer seize an item without a valid warrant, the citizen whose person, house,
papers, or effects had been the subject of a trespass could hold the officer liable
in tort.30
The Founders’ goal in eliminating general warrants was to ensure that the
oppressive practices of the crown in Great Britain could not be used in their new
nation.31 Famous English cases involving the search and seizure of papers to
silence critics of the king struck a nerve with many of the colonies.32 The first
of these cases surrounds Mr. John Wilkes, who was accused of writing articles
mocking the king and his ministers.33 Wilkes was subjected to an invasive search
under a general warrant and subsequently arrested.34 Wilkes sought to enforce
his right to security in his house and brought trespass actions against the officers
who searched his property; the jury ultimately ruled in favor of Wilkes.35
The second case, which arose out of similar circumstances to Wilkes, was
Entick v. Carrington,36 a cornerstone case that “foreshadowed the requirements
of the fourth amendment’s search and seizure clause by holding that seizures of
certain papers are impermissibly intrusive.”37 In Entick, the Secretary of State
authorized a warrant to search for some documents on Entick’s land.38 In
executing the warrant, many of Entick’s books, papers, and pamphlets were
seized.39 Entick sued for trespass, leading the court to condemn the search and
27 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal
Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 985 (2016) (“[D]ictionaries from the period
indicate that ‘effects’ was synonymous with personal property. . . .”).
28 Id. at 991.
29 LEVY, supra note 25, at 577.
30 Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 60 (1996).
31 Id. at 74.
32 Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869,
887, 928 (1985).
33 Id. at 887, 887 n.102; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489.
34 Schnapper, supra note 32, at 886–87 (explaining that the warrant failed to name
Wilkes, and it did not specify items to be seized or particular places to be searched).
35 Id. at 887–88.
36 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. For a complete
account on the Entick decision, look to the Howell’s State Trials. They present “the
Judgment itself at length, as delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas from
written notes.”; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880.
37 Schnapper, supra note 32, at 876–77.
38 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880.
39 Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 880.
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seizure; the court then held that the government could not seize private papers
even with a valid warrant.40 For the court, the issue was much deeper than the
physical trespass; rather, it was concerned with protecting “the indefeasible
rights of personal security, liberty, and private property.”41
Wilkes and Entick served as an impetus to the Founding Fathers to ensure the
types of governmental overreach that had occurred at the hands of the British
were not adopted in their new nation. Instead, the Framers believed judicial
officers were more adept at determining whether a search was reasonable,42
favoring judicial approval for specific warrants to determine whether there were
adequate grounds for intrusion.43
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant a right to privacy,44 Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence encompasses an expectation of privacy. In 1890,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote about the legal right to privacy,
declaring the right to privacy as an individual’s “right of determining ordinarily,
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others.”45 Furthermore, they articulated privacy as the “right to be let alone.”46
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AS A GENERAL WARRANT
The Framers loathed general warrants primarily because they did not want
one individual with arbitrary discretion to decide when someone or something
would be searched, especially with respect to “persons, houses, papers, and
effects.”47
Wilkes and Entick exemplify a time when the English government used
general warrants to invade the privacy of its people at its own will.48 This
behavior is similar to the third-party doctrine, because the doctrine allows for
the exercise of broad discretion when dealing with an individual and his or her
effects.49 Currently, the third-party doctrine enables the police and government
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1030–32; Schnapper, supra note 32, at 881.
Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198
(2016).
42 Davies, supra note 22, at 577.
43 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADE OFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY 4 (2011).
44 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ “).
45 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198 (1890).
46 Id. at 193.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING 56–58, 96–100, 439–40, 490–91 (2009).
49 John Villasenor, What You Need to Know About the Third-Party Doctrine, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what40
41
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to engage in surveillance and monitoring of one’s daily life, similar to the
general warrant that the Fourth Amendment ultimately intended to prevent.50
The Founding Fathers would have despised this doctrine.
In today’s digitally connected world, the police only need to issue a subpoena
to a third party to request desired data; there is no warrant requirement.51
Without a specific warrant, the government is conducting the very type of
general searches the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent.52 This
amendment guarantees citizens freedom from arbitrary government intrusion.53
It rests on the right to be free from government surveillance unless there is
probable cause.54
The third-party doctrine ignores the warrant requirement in the Fourth
Amendment and allows the police to circumvent a warrant request from a judge,
undermining free society and creating a culture of routine surveillance.
III. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE CASE REVIEW
The progression of case law can help determine whether the third-party
doctrine should still govern access to information as technology becomes
increasingly complex and common. The following Supreme Court cases detail
the development of the third-party doctrine.
Katz is the starting point for many Fourth Amendment cases because this is
where the Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
which was articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.55 Harlan’s two-part
framework first asks whether an individual retained an “actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy,” and second, whether that expectation is one that
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ “56 The party must satisfy both
prongs of this test to claim there has been an intrusion that is recognized under
the Fourth Amendment.57 The court has since endorsed this framework and
considers it to be controlling in Fourth Amendment analysis.58
you-need-to-know-about-the-third-party-doctrine/282721/.
50 Id.
51 See Slobogin, supra note 15, at 826.
52 Id.
53 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
54 Id. at 356–57.
55 See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Id.
58 Mike Godwin, What’s Next for the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? The Supreme
Court’s Ruling in Carpenter Raises New Questions., SLATE (June 27, 2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/06/after-the-supreme-courts-carpenter-ruling-where-isthe-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-heading.html.
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In Katz, the court held that electronically listening to and recording the
defendant’s words by wiretapping a public phone booth, the door of which was
closed, violated the defendant’s privacy.59 Because the defendant in Katz took a
reasonable step to protect his privacy by shutting the door to the booth,60 he was
likely more concerned about an “uninvited ear” than an “intruding eye.”61
Prior to Katz, the court had held that searches typically had to occur in
someone’s home; however, after Katz, a physical intrusion was no longer
necessary to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.62 In establishing
these new provisions, the court reasoned that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”63
Miller and Smith are two of the most significant Fourth Amendment cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the twentieth century.64 These cases preceded
the rise of mass digital information aggregation, and, since these cases, there has
been a surge of data collection and processing.65 In Miller, the respondent was
suspected of running an illegal whiskey distillery.66 Federal agents subpoenaed
his bank records and Miller objected, claiming his bank records were his private
papers.67 The court overruled this objection, holding that because the banking
information was shared voluntarily with the banks, Miller forfeited his privacy
attached to his financial records.68 Since the information was voluntarily shared,
Miller had not been searched under Katz.69 In reaching this conclusion, the court
distinguished “confidential communications” from “negotiable instruments to
be used in commercial transactions,” finding that bank records fit into the latter
category.70 Miller suggests that when documents are voluntarily conveyed to a
third party, regardless of the purpose of conveyance, the individual relinquishes
an expectation of privacy in those documents.71
A few years later, the Supreme Court decided Smith, holding that a warrant is
not required when a telephone company voluntarily agrees to record a particular

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 352.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 353; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928) overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
64 THOMPSON II, supra note 7, at 9.
65 Id. at 2, 23–25.
66 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
67 Id. at 436, 438–39.
68 Id. at 437, 442–43.
69 Id. at 443.
70 Id. at 442.
71 Id. at 443.
59
60
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user’s telephone number records and to furnish said records to the police.72 The
court noted that because most people at the time were aware that the phone
company recorded the phone numbers they dialed by using pen registers, there
was no legitimate expectation of privacy.73 In addition, because the information
was voluntarily disclosed, Smith assumed the risk that the telephone company
might disclose the information to the police.74 The court further reasoned:
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the
modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally
completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had
placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different
constitutional result is required because the telephone company has
decided to automate.75
In Smith, the presence of technology did not alter the application of the thirdparty doctrine.76
The court differentiated Smith from Katz, stating that the pen registers at issue
in Smith “[did] not acquire the contents of communications,” as in Katz.77 Justice
Stewart further clarified the line between content and non-content general
records in his Smith dissent:
Nevertheless, the Court today says [Fourth Amendment] safeguards
do not extend to the numbers dialed from a private telephone,
apparently because when a caller dials a number the digits may be
recorded by the telephone company for billing purposes. . . . The
telephone conversation itself must be electronically transmitted by
telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by
the use of other company equipment. Yet we have squarely held that
the user of even a public telephone is entitled “to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.”78
In dissent, Justice Stewart explained that people retain a reasonable expectation

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
Id. at 743; Pen Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a pen
register as “an electronic device that tracks and records all the numbers dialed from a
particular telephone line, as well as all the routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by other means of electronic communications”).
74 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
75 Id. at 744–45 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 742–45.
77 Id. at 741.
78 Id. at 746–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
352 (1967)).
72
73
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of privacy in their conversations regardless of where they occur.79
In 2012, the court decided United States v. Jones.80 In Jones, government
agents installed a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking device on the
defendant’s vehicle without a valid warrant.81 Ultimately, the placement of the
device constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the
majority returned to pre-Katz doctrine, emphasizing the fact that because the
government had physically attached the GPS device to the vehicle (an effect),
the government had physically intruded, and therefore, a search had occurred.82
A year later, the court examined the warrantless search and seizure of cellular
telephone contents incident to arrest in Riley v. California.83 The Supreme Court
created yet another exception to the Fourth Amendment when it decided that a
warrant must be obtained from a judicial officer before law enforcement officers
can search the contents of a phone.84 Although the third-party doctrine was not
discussed at length in Riley, the opinion did demonstrate the court’s recognition
of the difficulties that consumers and courts face when assessing whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored on
electronic devices.85 The importance of Riley becomes clear when considering
if the data the government is interested in resides on the device because, if so,
then it should receive the same Fourth Amendment protections as data stored on
a computer or a cellphone.86 The court in Riley also considered the immense
storage capacity that is available on cellphones; modern cellphones gather
information and store that information in one place, thus the records can provide
a detailed look into an individual’s life.87
Thus, Jones is controlling with respect to GPS searches with a physical
trespass, and Riley is controlling when searching a cellphone’s data. Jones and
Riley were the Supreme Court’s first steps in addressing technology in the digital
age. The Carpenter case is a blend of these two cases; the case involves long
term tracking like in Jones, as well as a device that can pinpoint location with
near-perfect accuracy, like in Riley.
In Carpenter, the petitioner was charged with aiding and abetting robbery that
affected interstate commerce after the FBI obtained orders from a magistrate
judge for cellphone records88 under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).89
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Riley v. United States, 573 U.S. 373, 378–79 (2014).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 392–395.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
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This act, enacted by Congress as Title II of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”), set forth provisions detailing privacy expectations with
respect to means of electronic transmission, which include telephones and
computers.90 With Carpenter, the act gave the government access to petitioner’s
CSLI obtained from a third-party cellphone service provider that would
otherwise be private information.91 CSLI is produced when a phone user sends
or receives data, such as phone calls or text messages, which are then transmitted
to the closest cellular tower through radio waves, thus producing precise
records.92 These records include the date and time of transmitted data and the
approximate location of where the call began and ended based on the proximity
of the nearest cell tower.93 Under the SCA, law enforcement does not need to
obtain a search warrant in order to access these records; rather, law enforcement
must only obtain a court order by meeting the reasonable suspicion standard,
which is below the probable cause standard that must be met in order to secure
a warrant.94
In Carpenter, the police obtained a court order permitting a search of
Carpenter’s cell records, pursuant to the Stored Communications Act.95 To
receive this order, law enforcement demonstrated their strong belief to the
government that the records would be relevant to a robbery investigation after
receiving tips from one suspect who provided the accomplice’s cellphone
number.96 The government collected “12,898 location points cataloging
Carpenter’s movements,” which is “an average of 101 data points per day”97
over 127 days.98 Using these location points, Carpenter was placed at the scene
of four robberies in question, leading to Carpenter’s conviction and a prison
sentence of one-hundred years.99 Following the conviction and appeal, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.100

Id. § 2702(a)(2)(A).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2226.
92 Alexander Monteith, Cell Site Location Information: A Catalyst for Change in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 82, 84 (2017); see How to Track
Your Cell Phone, WHIZ CELLS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.thewhizcells.com/how-totrack-your-cell-phone/.
93 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); Monteith, supra note 92, at 82–83.
95 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 2209.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2212–13.
100 Id. at 2213.
90
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A. The New Rule of Carpenter
Prior third-party doctrine cases, like Miller and Smith, left individuals with no
legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy claim in information
voluntarily shared with third parties.101 At first blush, because CSLI is held by
carriers (i.e. third parties) and not customers, Carpenter appeared to fall under
this doctrine, leaving U.S. citizens vulnerable to retrospective location-tracking
and warrantless searches on behalf of the government.102 In writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts took a different approach.
Roberts wrote, “As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to
encroach upon areas normally guarded against inquisitive eyes, this Court
sought to ‘assure [] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’ “103 He added that
because “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements,” the third-party doctrine does not extend to
mobile location information.104
Because CSLI is no more than a byproduct of owning a cellphone, the
government generally needs a warrant to access those records, especially if the
government is requesting more than seven days of records from the cellphone
carrier.105 According to the majority in Carpenter, the police cannot collect
historical CSLI from a cellphone service provider due to its “depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its
collection.”106 If the depth and reach of the surveillance threatens to become “a
too permeating police surveillance,” it may be justifiable to designate the search
as an intrusive search under the Fourth Amendment.107
Due to the “world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of
location information casually collected by wireless carriers today,”108 the
majority declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the government’s request
for CSLI.109 Although the court noted that “seismic shifts in digital technology”
have transformed the traditional third-party doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts
101 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976).
102 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
103 Id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
104 Id. at 2217.
105 Id. at 2212, 2217. The Court did not explain why seven days is the maximum for
surveillance. Subsequent cases will have to weigh this cutoff against privacy interests. Id.
106 Id. at 2223.
107 Id. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
108 Id. at 2219.
109 Id. at 2220 (finding that CSLI “implicate[d] privacy concerns far beyond those
considered in Smith and Miller”).
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limited the language of Carpenter beyond the application of Smith and Miller,
stating the decision does not “call into question conventional, surveillance
techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business
records that might incidentally reveal location information.”110
Rather than close this gap in legislation, the court in Carpenter crafted a
narrow exception to the third-party doctrine for the “unique nature of cell phone
location records,” requiring the government to obtain a warrant “[b]efore
compelling a wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI.”111 The court
made sure to emphasize that this ruling did not impact Miller and Smith.112
This effort to limit the scope of Carpenter raises questions about the vast
amount of information that resides outside of the outdated pen registers
discussed in Smith and the paper bank statements at issue in Miller; nowadays,
“the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location
information” with “just the click of a button.”113 The court also clarified that
there is no distinction between the contents of cellphones and the CSLI metadata
they generate.114 The availability of all this information causes concern when
one considers how common technology is in society and the vast amount of
information that is shared online.
Carpenter raises questions about the continued validity of the Katz test in a
digital world.115 Evolving technologies transform which expectations of privacy
are considered “reasonable,” as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have noted.116 At
the time Miller and Smith were decided, forfeiting privacy rights on a tangible
item like a pen register or a bank document seemed reasonable.117 However,
applying the third-party doctrine to online activity, where most of the data is
stored in one place, poses challenges. As Justice Sotomayor expressed in her
concurrence in Jones:
It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has

110 Id.; Louise Matsakis, The Supreme Court Just Greatly Strengthened Digital Privacy,
WIRED (June 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/carpenter-v-united-states-supremecourt-digital-privacy/ (implying that “other sensitive digital information … [like] emails,
smart-home appliances, and technology that is yet to be invented” are not yet safe).
111 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2221.
112 Id. at 2217, 2220.
113 Id. at 2218.
114 Id. at 2210.
115 Id. at 2228.
116 Id. at 2217, 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
117 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); see MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW
RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN
ERA 2, 3 (2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/11
/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (“[Americans] are willing to make tradeoffs in
certain circumstances when their sharing of information provides access to free services.”).
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.118
Technology adds a complex layer to evaluating privacy expectations.119 The
court in Carpenter had an opportunity to clarify exactly how the government can
and should interact with technology. Yet, the narrow ruling in Carpenter made
the rules of engagement even more confusing. Carpenter leaves many questions
open and invites future arguments before the Supreme Court on the topics of
technology and privacy. For example, unanswered questions include exactly
how much digital data law enforcement may possess without a warrant and when
a third party is required to disclose its business records.120 While Carpenter did
signal that the Fourth Amendment may protect other types of personal
information held by third parties, such as records regarding location information,
the case also raises questions about third-party files similar to CSLI.121 As there
was no constitutional limit discussed in Carpenter regarding CSLI, there is no
legal limit meant to restrict location surveillance by law enforcement; the
impacts of Carpenter reach far beyond CSLI, which fails to protect privacy
interests while advancing the interest of government spying.122
IV. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The crucial question for the Supreme Court in deciding in favor of Carpenter
focused on whether the automatic generation of CSLI is just a byproduct of
having a cellphone; today, cellphones require no affirmative action.123 In other
words, as long as the phone is powered on and there is a cellphone tower near
the phone’s location, its location is being recorded and transmitted to the third118 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
119 Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
120 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (holding the seizure of seven days of CSLI data
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, but the court did not state how many fewer days
would also constitute a search).
121 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (discussing the fact that advances in technology have led to
people willingly disclosing to third parties more personal information than in the past).
122 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“[W]e need not decide whether there is a limited
period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be. It is sufficient for our
purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.”).
123 Id. at 2220.
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party cellphone carrier.124
Generally, voluntary conveyance is the premise that threatens the third-party
doctrine in the technological era. For an action to be considered voluntary, it
must have been intended, which presumes that the individual knew the relevant
information would be conveyed.125 Given how omnipresent and necessary
technology and technological disclosures are, it is nearly impossible to deem
these actions as voluntary.126
Prior cases involving privacy have referred to this voluntary participation as
an “assumption of risk.”127 “When a party reveals private information to another,
he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the
authorities, and if that occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
governmental use of that information.”128 As a result of voluntary conveyance
and the assumption of risk under the third-party doctrine, the government is
permitted to investigate information disclosed to third-party businesses without
a warrant.129 However, merely allowing a device into one’s life should not be
enough to void one’s privacy rights, which have been guaranteed to citizens
since the time of this country’s founding.
In Carpenter, the court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to CSLI as
there was no voluntary exposure given that carrying a cellphone has become
commonplace; in fact, the court even recognized this as “indispensable to
participation in modern society.”130 The same will likely be true of other smart
devices, including those found in smart homes.
An individual may initiate self-surveillance, for example, by purchasing an
Amazon Echo or using a smartwatch; therefore, it could be argued that while
using the basic functions of the device, the individual has affirmatively engaged

124 The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEF.,
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones (last updated Oct. 30, 2018).
125 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20; see Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
126 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (stating that a voluntary exposure of location
information to a third-party does not hold up when it comes to CSLI because carrying a cell
phone is indispensable to participation in modern society).
127 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979); see also United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
128 Denae Kassotis, The Fourth Amendment and Technological Exceptionalism After
Carpenter: A Case Study on Hash-Value Matching, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1243, 1275 (2019).
129 Id. at 1272.
130 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted It
Will Use Smart Home Devices for Spying, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-smart-devicesspying-surveillance-us-government/.
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the device to relay a multitude of information.131 However, the individual does
not intend to share, nor could he or she ever imagine, the amount of information
found on these devices, especially when this information is sent to other third
parties to market products to consumers.132 People connect to technology to
establish and maintain relationships and function in society.133 They voluntarily
disclose detailed information about their private lives, such as information about
religious views or sexual preferences, to social media platforms, including
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, so they can participate in digital social life.134
Many of these third-party service providers or social media platforms ask users
to click “I Agree” after a long terms of service agreement or privacy disclosure
agreement.135 However, the average person does not have the time to read these
lengthy documents, nor can they understand the complicated legalese that these
agreements often contain.136 Even if he or she can understand the complicated
legalese, the individual typically fails to understand the ramifications of sharing
the information or even the depths of information stored on him or her.137
V. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGIES
Self-cyber surveillance is the “intentional or consensual creation of mass
information about oneself through electronic tracking or other means.”138 This
self-cyber surveillance has changed the daily lives of many individuals and has
altered the privacy of their information.139 Assistive technologies present an
issue in the accumulation of data retained by third-party businesses.140 This data
131 Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things,
59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 441–42 (2018).
132 See, e.g., id. at 429.
133 See, e.g., Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Social Relations, PEW RES.
CTR. (July 2, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2010/07/02/the-future-of-socialrelations-2/.
134 See generally Joshua L. Simmons, Buying You: The Government’s Use of FourthParties to Launder Data About “The People”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 990–91
(describing how companies can “provide lists of people who take Prozac for depression,
believe in the Bible, gamble online, or buy sex toys”).
135 See Kevin Litman-Navarro, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an
Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-privacy-policies.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
136 See, e.g., id.
137 See, e.g., id. (describing how policies can be impenetrable for consumers as data
collection measures become more sophisticated).
138 Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance
from the Internet of Things Is Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 892
(2017).
139 Id.
140 The issue raised is only when the data resides in the cloud or in the hands of a thirdparty service provider. Data housed in the device is protected under Riley. Riley v.
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creation and collection is described loosely as the Internet of Things (“IoT”).141
IoT is defined as the “aggregation of systems of networks connected to each
other by the Internet or other radio-type device,” which “creates consensual mass
self-surveillance.”142 Because this includes any device with the ability to connect
to the internet, a host of devices are included that seamlessly share information
to “improve consumer, commercial, health, and other needs.”143 The records
aggregated from these devices could consist of either metadata or content, or a
mixture of both.144 Examples of these devices include medicine dispensers that
remind individuals to take their medicine,145 thermostats that allow individuals
to adjust their settings from a smartphone,146 or even a trashcan that “scans the
barcodes of discarded products, automatically adds them to a smartphone’s
shopping list, and sends a text when the trashcan is full.”147 IoT also includes inhome technologies, such as the Amazon Echo, and biometric data found on
Apple Watches and FitBit devices.148 The information shared with these devices
can also be shared with other devices and applications.149 Many of these devices
operate by using the same passive data collection that smartphones do; in
addition, the signals from the devices make them communication devices.150
Thus, these devices are similar to cellphones and the reasoning behind CSLI
protection in Carpenter should be extended to them.151
The aggregation of smart technology data also allows the government to work
with corporations to create detailed reports on unsuspecting individuals who

California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014).
141 Friedland, supra note 138, at 892; see also The Internet of Things (IoT), SAS,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/internet-of-things.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2020).
142 Friedland, supra note 138, at 892–93.
143 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812 (2016).
144 See generally id. at 873 (discussing the distinction between metadata and content
data).
145 Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case Study, Internet of Things (IoT), BERKMAN CTR.
FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Apr. 16, 2012), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/97248.
146 How Home/Away Assist Uses Your Phone’s Location, GOOGLE NEST HELP,
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9262475?hl=en (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
147 Ryan G. Bishop, Note, The Walls Have Ears, and Eyes, and Noses: Home Smart
Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 668 (2019).
148 John A. Rothchild, Against Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of the
Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy Online (or Anywhere Else), 66 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 559, 573 (2018).
149 Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 118 (1999).
150 Ferguson, supra note 143, at 818.
151 Christopher Mims, All Ears: Always-On Listening Devices Could Soon Be
Everywhere, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/all-ears-always-onlistening-devices-could-soon-be-everywhere-1531411250.
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may have committed crimes.152 Since Carpenter’s narrow decision regarding
CSLI, the third-party doctrine remains relatively undisturbed.153 However, more
information will continue to be shared with third-party service providers,
especially with the advent of new technology. This allows for the disjunction
between constitutional protections and technology surveillance and allows the
gap between the two to become progressively more pronounced. In fact, the fear
of government surveillance is not speculative; the government has requested
data in the past, notably, to solve crimes, but it is not difficult to imagine this
data being used in nefarious ways.
A. Smart Home Devices
Smart home devices “connect the devices and appliances in your home so that
they can communicate with each other and with you.”154 These devices are a
natural progression of IoT. Accordingly, a smart home is defined by appliances
or devices that are capable of connecting with one another through phone
applications and the internet.155
The Amazon Echo is a smart home device that can respond to voice queries
about the weather, turn down the lights or the temperature, and even order the
groceries.156 Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated digital assistant, powers Echo
devices.157 For the Echo to respond to the owner’s request, it listens for the
device activation word, “Alexa.”158 Meanwhile, the Echo “records your voice
and transfers it to a processor for analysis”; the recordings are then streamed and
stored remotely in the cloud where they can be reviewed at a later date.159 The
See Timm, supra note 130.
Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity Can Categorize ThirdParty Data After Carpenter, 53 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1058 (2019).
154 Adrienne McClain, Is the Government Using Your Refrigerator to Spy on You, 19 W.
MICH. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 327, 330 (2018); Molly Edwards & Nathan
Chandler, How Smart Homes Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://home.howstuffworks.com/
smart-home1.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
155 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547,
585 (2017).
156 Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 9,
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402); Alexa User Guide: Learn
What Alexa Can Do, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b?node=17934671011 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2020); Anne Pfeifle, Alexa, What Should We Do About Privacy? Protecting
Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421, 440 (2018).
157 Pfeifle, supra note 156, at 421; Alexa User Guide: Learn What Alexa Can Do, supra
note 156.
158 Pfeifle, supra note 156, at 421–22; Alexa User Guide: Learn What Alexa Can Do,
supra note 156.
159 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to Hand over Echo Recordings in
Murder Case, CNN BUS. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazonecho-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case/index.html; Alexa User Guide: Learn What
152
153
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preferences expressed by an individual to his or her smart home device are used
to create a comprehensive profile based on that specific consumer’s activities,
including his daily activities (through the calendar applications), or his health
profile (through health monitoring applications);160 this profile is then shared by
third parties.
A specific example occurred in a widely publicized 2015 case, in which it was
alleged that an Amazon Echo recorded audio of a man, James Bates, murdering
his wife in his home.161 Although Mr. Bates consented to the release of records
held by Amazon, this story represents a cautionary tale regarding the information
the Amazon Echo retains and is later available, information that the government
can seize under the third-party doctrine.162 These records contain some of our
innermost thoughts, including details about our familial, professional, religious,
and political ties.
On the one hand, because Echo users voluntarily convey this information to
third parties, there are no Fourth Amendment protections implicated.163 In
contrast, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has rendered the home supreme.164
Justice Scalia indicated that at the core of the Fourth Amendment was the
individual’s “right to retreat into his own home” and to “be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”165 Furthermore, Riley concerns are
implicated due to the capabilities of these smart home devices.166 The home has
been considered a sacred place since the time of the Framers and throughout
Fourth Amendment history.167 However, IoT has grown, mostly unregulated,
and it is threatening the sanctity of the home.168 Without a Fourth Amendment
Alexa Can Do, supra note 156.
160 Alexa User Guide: Learn What Alexa Can Do, supra note 156.
161 McLaughlin, supra note 159.
162 Arielle M. Rediger, Always-Listening Technologies: Who Is Listening and What Can
Be Done About It, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 229, 247 (2017).
163 Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 553, 640 (2016).
164 See Donohue, supra note 41, at 1192; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984) (“At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which
the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.”).
165 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the
home . . . all details are intimate details.”).
166 Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLeon, Riley v. California: Privacy Still Matters,
but How Much and in What Contexts, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 25, 36 (2014).
167 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 936 (2010).
168 See generally Study Reveals Desire for MORE Regulation in IoT World,
BUSINESSWIRE (Feb. 12, 2018, 8:00 AM),
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exception, if the police were to physically enter your home and seize your IoT
device, later downloading the data, you would have a trespass to your property
and effects, and therefore a violation of your privacy.169 This concept becomes
hazy when discussing an interception of your data on the device. This is because,
as the Echo is always listening, the device serves as a covert listening device,
informally, “a bug” or wiretap.170 Although a user can delete the records that
Alexa creates (although it is unclear how many records are deleted from the
cache of information), it is strongly discouraged because the loss of records
impairs the performance of the device.171 Compelling individuals to sacrifice
their privacy rights to their information stored by third parties for the sake of
convenience is neither reasonable nor acceptable.
When an individual acquires a new device, he or she is most likely not rushing
home to read the privacy policy.172 Rather, he or she rushes home to install the
new piece of technology and to start using it. This hastiness almost always
results in the user relinquishing personal data in exchange for the use of the new
device. For example, in 2015, Samsung was in the news for a privacy policy
related to the use of its Smart TVs.173 The company had initially cautioned
customers that, through the use of voice recognition, data would be transmitted
to third parties.174 It did not take long for consumers and news outlets to begin
reporting on the issue, comparing the Samsung Smart TVs to the telescreens
featured in George Orwell’s 1984.175 Following the backlash, Samsung changed
the Smart TV privacy policy to state explicitly how the Voice Recognition
technology worked. The new policy states:
If you enable Voice Recognition, you can interact with your Smart
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180212005111/en/Study-Reveals-DesireRegulation-IoT-World (explaining that IoT workers view IoT as underregulated and in need
of more government oversight and control).
169 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (emphasizing the higher
degree of protection afforded to the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
170 Jeb Su, Why Amazon Alexa Is Always Listening to Your Conversations: Analysis,
FORBES (May 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/05/16/whyamazon-alexa-is-always-listening-to-your-conversations-analysis/#74fcdfb2378e.
171 Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Love the Sound of Your
Voice, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201612-13/why-google-microsoft-and-amazon-love-the-sound-of-your-voice.
172 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that a person can
be held to the terms of a contract online without express acceptance).
173 See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, Samsung Smart TV Policy Allows Company to Listen in on
Users, INDEP. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-andtech/news/samsungs-new-smart-tv-policy-allows-company-to-listen-in-on-users10033012.html.
174 Natasha Lomas, Samsung Edits Orwellian Clause Out of TV Privacy Policy, TECH.
CRUNCH (Feb. 10, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/10/smarttv-privacy/#.
puzvmzo:yfMB.
175 Id.
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TV using your voice. To provide the Voice Recognition feature, your
voice commands will be transmitted (along with information about
your device, including device identifiers) to us and we will convert
your voice commands into text to provide the Voice Recognition
features. In addition, Samsung may collect voice commands and
associated texts so that we can evaluate and improve the features.
Samsung will collect your voice commands when you make a
specific request to the Smart TV by clicking the activation button
either on the remote control or on your screen or by speaking a wake
word … and speaking into the microphone on the remote control or
Smart TV.176
Samsung also clarified that individuals could opt-out of voice recognition if they
had privacy concerns, but the capabilities would be impacted.177
B. Biometric Technology
FitBit devices, computing watches designed to track physical activity, raise
additional concerns. Typically, the Fitbit monitors blood pressure, gives a sleep
assessment, and counts steps, all of which is intended to help consumers gauge
their personal health better.178 This device also logs location information and
uploads this information to a computer or mobile device if it is within range of
a wireless internet source.179
This biometric data involves private information that, without the device, the
individual most likely would not have; this information is extraordinarily
intimate. However, this information can be “accessed, aggregated (even
anonymized), and sorted by health companies or insurers to predict health trends
and create more efficiencies in their businesses,” which could pique the interest
of other third parties and the government.180 Yet, anonymity may not be enough
to ensure privacy is protected.181 In fact, according to one researcher, “[t]he way
we move . . . is so unique that four points [of location information] are enough
to identify 95% of people.”182
176 Samsung Privacy Policy for the U.S., SAMSUNG, https://account.samsung.com/
membership/terms/privacypolicy (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
177 Id.
178 Twomey, supra note 10, at 419.
179 Why is the Fitbit App Prompting Me to Turn on Location Services?, FITBIT,
https://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/2134 (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
180 Friedland, supra note 138, at 897.
181 Bryan Lufkin, The Reasons You Can’t Be Anonymous Anymore, BBC (May 29,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170529-the-reasons-you-can-never-beanonymous-again.
182 Jason Palmer, Mobile Location Data ‘Present Anonymity Risk,’ BBC (Mar. 25,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-21923360.
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The technology behind Fitbit devices is advanced enough that Fitbits can
track physical exertion consistent with violent acts183 or monitor the elevated
blood pressure of someone under the influence of drugs.184
This newfound way of continued attachment to the digital world begs one
major question: Would the information gathered, likely voluntarily, through
various sources be considered a business record, thereby requiring third-party
services to turn over the information on their customers?
C. Internet Tracking
It is unclear whether Carpenter applies to all forms of location data,
specifically geotags that are embedded in digital photographs and describe the
time, date, and GPS coordinates of where a photograph was taken, as well as
where the individual logged in to a social-media site if the photograph was
posted.185 Geotags are similar to CSLI because they are often automatically
collected without affirmative action by the user.186 However, they are slightly
different because posting a picture on a public social media site is an affirmative
action in which the user acknowledges that an indiscriminate group of people
could see the post.187 This is what happened to millionaire John McAfee, founder
of McAfee Security Software Company.188 McAfee was wanted by law
enforcement in connection with a crime, and, although he threw out some taunts,
authorities could not catch him, until a journalist took a photograph with McAfee
and uploaded it online.189 This photograph had been routinely geotagged,
leading a computer hacker to MacAfee’s exact location in a Guatemalan
village.190 While this case was a win for the police, this case should resonate
with the average person. It was not difficult for the computer hacker to collect
this information, even after MacAfee believed he had taken steps to conceal his

183 Christine Hauser, Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 90-Year-Old Man in
Stepdaughter’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html.
184 Ferguson, supra note 155, at 561.
185 GERALD FRIEDLAND & ROBIN SOMMER, INT’L COMPUT. SCI. INST., CYBERCASING THE
JOINT: ON THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF GEO-TAGGING 1 (2010), https://www.usenix.org/
legacy/events/hotsec10/tech/full_papers/Friedland.pdf.
186 How to Challenge Cell-Site Location Information, EFF, https://www.eff.org/
criminaldefender/cell-site-location/how-challenge (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
187 Ferguson, supra note 155, at 623–24.
188 Craig Timberg, Hacker Locates John McAfee Through Smartphone Tracks, WASH.
POST (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hacker-locatesjohn-mcafee-through-smartphone-tracks/2012/12/04/55a498d8-3e4a-11e2-bca3aadc9b7e29c5_story.html.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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location.191 Hackers with nefarious intentions could have uncovered this
geotagged location, and, in the case MacAfee, who had not been accused of
anything, the police could have then reviewed it for evidence.192
The government also has access to many of our routine activities. As Eleventh
Circuit Judge Beverly Martin expressed:
Nearly every website collects information about what we do when
we visit. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment allows the government to
know from YouTube.com what we watch, or Facebook.com what we
post or whom we “friend,” or Amazon.com what we buy, or
Wikipedia.com what we research, or Match.com whom we date—all
without a warrant. In fact, the government could ask “cloud”-based
file-sharing services like Dropbox or Apple’s iCloud for all the files
we relinquish to their servers. I am convinced that most internet users
would be shocked by this.193
Individuals leave a digital footprint anytime they interact with devices that
connect to the internet.194 Paul Ohm, a professor at Georgetown Law Center and
a privacy advocate, testified to Congress with respect to the trove of data
collected by sources:
The list of websites an individual visits, available to a [broadband
internet access service] provider even when https encryption is used,
reveals so much more than a member of a prior generation would
have revealed in a composite list of every book she had checked out,
every newspaper and magazine she had subscribed to, every theater
she had visited, every television channel she had clicked to, and
every bulletin, leaflet, and handout she had read. No power in the
technological history of our nation has been able until now to watch
us read individual articles, calculate how long we linger on a given
page, and reconstruct the entire intellectual history of what we read
and watch on a minute-by-minute, individual-by-individual basis.195
Web browsing records give the government access to an unprecedented
amount of information, and a staggering amount is left unprotected.196 For
instance, individuals share information about themselves simply by surfing the
Id.
See generally id.
193 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Martin, J.,
dissenting).
194 See Ferguson, supra note 155, at 585 (discussing a situation where an internet
enabled thermostat was used to reveal confidential information about a homeowner).
195 Paul Ohm, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Statement at FCC Overreach:
Examining the Proposed Privacy Rules: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology (June 14, 2016).
196 Davis, 785 F.3d at 536 (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting).
191
192
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web because of the tracking methods websites use to store information.197 One
way websites track people is through cookies, which are small pieces of code
sent back to the company that detail “whether you are a returning user, the sites
you visited before, and after visiting their web site, the items you view on a web
site, and sometimes even the information you enter into the computer while on
the web site.”198
D. Storage in the Cloud
Today, much of one’s private data is held in the “cloud,” which is defined as
a “combination of structured, semistructured, and unstructured data collected by
organizations that can be mined for information and used in … advanced
analytics applications.”199 Essentially, the user “rents space” on a trusted
server.200 One may do this either because one’s computer cannot store enough
on its hard drive, for additional protection should a file be wiped off his or her
computer, or both.201 Many users find cloud storage extremely convenient,
largely because the cloud can be accessed remotely.202 Nevertheless, cloud
storage is problematic because it requires users to give their data to a third-party
service provider who then stores this vast quantity of information.203
Apple’s iCloud Privacy Policy relating to cloud storage and law enforcement
provides:
You acknowledge and agree that Apple may, without liability to you,
access, use, preserve and/or disclose your Account information and
Content to law enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or
a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably necessary or
appropriate, if legally required to do so or if Apple has a good faith
belief that such access, use, disclosure, or preservation is reasonably
necessary to: (a) comply with legal process or request; (b) enforce
this Agreement, including investigation of any potential violation
thereof; (c) detect, prevent or otherwise address security, fraud or
technical issues; or (d) protect the rights, property or safety of Apple,
its users, a third party, or the public as required or permitted by
197 Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a
World of Digital Sharing and Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 731–34 (2013).
198 Id. at 731.
199 Margaret Rouse, Big Data, TECH. TARGET,
https://searchdatamanagement.techtarget.com/definition/big-data (last visited Apr. 27,
2020).
200 Erik C. Shallman, Comment, Up in the Air: Clarifying Cloud Storage Protections, 19
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 49, 54 (2014).
201 Id. at 50.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 50–51.
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law.204
This privacy policy affords very little protection to consumers’ data once the
data is transferred to the Apple iCloud.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE CLOUD
The SCA, which is part of the ECPA, was an act created to regulate electronic
communications.205 However, it addresses the technology of the 1960s, thereby
rendering it nearly ineffective to support privacy intrusions by the government
on third-party servers that store and process the data that emanates from our
modern devices.206
At the time of the SCA’s enactment, “digital information still resided in large
data centers” and “the data stored in data centers were not readily
transportable.”207 Because people, and companies, store data everywhere, the
question becomes: how should the SCA be interpreted in the digital age?
According to the SCA, a warrant is not required if the data has been stored for
more than 180 days.208 This stipulation made sense during this time, as online
storage of data in the cloud was extremely costly, and the IoT had not begun to
aggregate data as it does now.209 Privacy expectations should not diminish
simply because 180 days have elapsed, just as privacy expectations do not
diminish solely because time has passed.
This outdated language leads to another problem. The SCA defines electronic
storage “both as ‘any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof’ and ‘any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication.’ “210 Privacy protections
hinge on these crucial distinctions, but this second definition will cause problems
with the popularity of the cloud, as the language of the statute excludes much of

204 Welcome to iCloud, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/internetservices/icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2019).
205 Witte, supra note 197, at 748–49.
206 See Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional
Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 261,
263 (2013); Witte, supra note 197, at 749–50.
207 Wilson, supra note 206, at 263.
208 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
209 See Kalev Leetaru, The High Costs of Hosting Science’s Big Data: The Commercial
Cloud to the Rescue?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/
2016/01/03/the-high-costs-of-hosting-sciences-big-data-the-commercial-cloud-to-therescue/#12344d4f28c0.
210 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012).
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the data currently stored in the cloud.211 It also does not account for how quickly
and easily information can be accessed by a third party, which traditionally
might have been stored on a computer’s hard drive or in a file cabinet.212 The
immense amount of information stored in a cloud should be afforded greater
protection than is currently provided. For example, much of the information
stored through the third-party service Dropbox, a well-known cloud service
provider, should be covered under the SCA.213
Essentially, the files in these servers are “papers” in modern electronic
communications, making cloud storage entitled to an extension of Fourth
Amendment protection if one acknowledges the modern-day technological
equivalence of physical storage. In fact, “the cloud is merely an illusion,” as
information is stored on a physical server rather than a far-off intangible place,
as the name would suggest.214 The significant difference is that physical
limitations found in traditional Fourth Amendment cases involving a physical
intrusion are no longer commonplace in the digital age.215 Still, in relation to the
third-party doctrine, it remains unclear if cloud data can be considered business
records.216
VII. DISCUSSION OF CURRENT PRIVACY THEORIES
It is imperative that the Supreme Court establish a new precedent governing
government access to third-party records. These theories will only be described
insofar as they relate to technology.
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
Four decades have passed since Justice Harlan opined his reasonable
expectation of privacy test in his Katz concurrence, and the meaning of the
phrase is still unclear.217 However, this test is still the cornerstone of many
privacy rights cases.218
See Shallman, supra note 200, at 67.
See id. at 50.
213 Id. at 50–51 (explaining that Dropbox is a remote file-storage application that
automatically syncs digital files to its servers upon the user’s action).
214 Wei Chen Lin, Where Are Your Papers?: The Fourth Amendment, the Stored
Communications Act, the Third-Party Doctrine, the Cloud, and Encryption, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1093, 1107 (2016).
215 See id. at 1095.
216 See Shallman, supra note 200, at 60.
217 Expectation of Privacy, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/expectation_of_privacy (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
218 See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”
Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
211
212
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The reasonable expectation of privacy test is subjective and outdated. This
test assumes that judges can effectively assess what a “reasonable” person would
expect; however, there are two issues that arise from this test.219 First, by
assuming a judge can discern what a reasonable person might feel about a
specific type of technology, this also assumes that the judge is up to date on all
of the technologies people use on a daily basis.220 In addition, it does not leave
room for reasonable individuals to have differing opinions on what they see as,
in this case, a reasonable intrusion of privacy.221 Put simply, in a society that
normalizes comprehensive surveillance, how “reasonable” is the average
people, and who is the society? Does the average person’s opinion come from
the majority of people through a poll or survey? If so, this binds the minority
thinkers to the preferences of the majority, thus ignoring the goal of the Bill of
Rights of limiting the will of the majority.222 The second issue is related to the
outdated context of the test. It requires judges to consider new technology and
then create policy based on how they perceive Americans might understand the
latest technology and how the technology in question works.223
As it is currently understood, the expectation of privacy test is often the
dominant theory cited when questioning Fourth Amendment protections.224
B. Property/Trespass Theory
Physical intrusions, regardless of how major or minor the interference, can
generate a Fourth Amendment violation under the trespass theory.225 “The
property-based approach emphasizes the historical reverence of property rights
in the colonial era leading up to the American Revolution.”226 This approach
was frequently used up until the 1960s when the Katz balancing test replaced it;
the approach required individuals to prove that the government had physically
trespassed onto their property before Fourth Amendment relief could be
considered.227
See id. at 7.
See id. at 10.
221 See id. at 13.
222 SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 117.
223 Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 141 (2018) (discussing Justice Alito’s explanation of a “tradeoff”
individuals accept in diminished privacy for the increase of “convenience or security” of
new technology).
224 Id. at 129.
225 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that placement of the
GPS device without any other intrusion was a search).
226 Bishop, supra note 147, at 673.
227 Brady, supra note 27, at 949; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53
219
220
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In 2012, Jones dusted off the old trespass doctrine when the court decided that
a GPS attachment to a car used to monitor the vehicle’s movements was a
physical trespass.228 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stressed the
physical aspect of the search, reasoning that the government had intruded on the
Defendant’s privacy when it “inserted [an] information-gathering device.”229
However, the majority did not disturb the long-held privacy formulation defined
in Katz, signaling an era in which Fourth Amendment protections were
subjective and based on the type of trespass that occurred.230 Justice Scalia most
likely chose the property approach over the reasonable expectation of privacy
test established in Katz because it was more straight-forward.231
C. Mosaic Theory
Privacy activist Orin Kerr explains the “Mosaic Theory” as an “aggregated
set of data acquisitions,” noting that a set of non-searches can amount to a search
because the collection of the data and following analysis creates a revealing
mosaic of a person’s private life.232 It is the aggregation of these movements,
regardless of whether the movements occurred in public, that is worthy of
protection.233 A mosaic search might bring together locations and timeframes
that illustrate a comprehensive picture of a suspect’s life.234 The problem with
the Mosaic Theory, like with the current reasonable expectation of privacy
theory, is the subjective nature of a violation. The quality of the mosaic will be
different for each person, especially when considering the different kinds of
surveillance tools that are available, which raise their own reasonableness
concerns.235 Courts will then be forced to construct a framework for deciding
how much, or what kind of information can be gathered before a “search” has
occurred.236

(1967) (rejecting the notion that physical penetration into a protected area is required to
show a Fourth Amendment search).
228 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05, 410.
229 Id. at 410.
230 See id. at 411.
231 See generally id. at 407–08 (explaining that Katz preserved the right that an
unconstitutional physical intrusion of an area may be a Fourth Amendment violation, and
did not narrow the scope of the amendment).
232 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
326, 333 (2012).
233 Id. at 326.
234 Id. at 313.
235 Id. at 333, 336.
236 Id. at 329.
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D. Positive Law Theory
If a court decides to apply the positive law model, it considers whether there
is a law (or statute, rule, or code), other than the Fourth Amendment, that
restricts the government’s invasion.237 Positive law questions whether a search
or seizure occurs by determining whether a private party could lawfully conduct
the action the government engaged in.238 Accordingly, instead of the court being
concerned about a “reasonable search,” it would ask, whether in completing the
search, if the government official violated “general applicable law or avail[ed]
themselves of a governmental exemption from it.”239
Positive law may be problematic when new technologies arise because the
cornerstone of this theory is reliance on existing law. The rate at which
technology changes and adapts makes it nearly impossible for legislators to keep
up with regulating emerging technologies, and even if they try, a backlog may
result due to ever-changing technology.240 It is also possible that some kinds of
technology are so obscure that any sort of law regulating their use would be illadvised.241 Another roadblock preventing this theory from becoming a guiding
precedent is the existence of technology that only the government has access
to.242 It may be possible for lawmakers to tweak the laws to allow private parties
access to the technology to avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny, fully knowing
the private parties will never be able to access the devices.243
E. Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory is defined by privacy scholar Orin Kerr as
the idea that the courts adjust “legal rules to restore the preexisting balance of

237 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
516 (2007).
238 Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 314 (2016).
239 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1825–26 (2016).
240 See Re, supra note 238, at 327.
241 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (holding the government used a
device to complete a search that is not available to the general public, the search is
unreasonable and requires a warrant). Although you may now buy the device used in
question in Kyllo, it is not hard to convey this same holding to other devices not yet
available to the public.
242 See Katie Barlow, Thermal Imaging Gets More Common but the Courts Haven’t
Caught Up, NPR (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2014/02/25/282523377/thermal-imaging-gets-more-common-but-the-courts-havent-caughtup; see also Future Technology in Government, INST. FOR GOV’T (May 21, 2019),
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/future-technology-government.
243 Re, supra note 238, at 326.
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police power.”244 Under this theory, if a case arose, the judge would adjust the
level of protection for new technology to maintain this balance of power.245 Kerr
argues that the courts should decide this protection to restore a time which he
calls “Year Zero.”246 Year Zero is a fictional time that is used as a basis to see
how the “introduction of new tools poses a constant challenge to any legal
system that seeks to regulate police investigations.”247
This theory considers the dynamic nature of technology and social change,248
and realizes that new tools and attitudes threaten the security and privacy balance
between criminals and police because they allow both sides to “accomplish tasks
they couldn’t before” or undertake those tasks “more easily or cheaply than
before.”249 The police should not possess so much power that they are able to
infringe upon an individual’s civil liberties, but they must also be powerful
enough to enforce the law.250 This theory is more of a method of maintaining the
status quo of power rather than an effort to restore the Fourth Amendment to the
Founder’s original intent.
This theory only exacerbates the Fourth Amendment privacy judicial delay
problem that the courts already face. Kerr argues this delay would be encouraged
to ensure the courts do not make decisions about technology too quickly.251
However, this delay would only complicate decisions due to the difficult to
predict and progressive nature of IoT. This theory also requires judges to project
their respective opinions on various technology-focused cases.
VIII. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AFTER CARPENTER
Carpenter could have been used to fundamentally change the third-party
doctrine, but its narrow ruling raises questions and concerns about what kinds of
digital data and how much data the government may access without a warrant;
these concerns will likely continue to arise in future privacy cases.252 However,
Carpenter does provide a roadmap for future decisions as it disfavored the
government’s ability to claim “a significant extension of [the third-party
doctrine] to a distinct category of information.”253 The court acknowledged that
in order to live in modern society, the use of smart technologies is
244 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 482 (2011).
245 Id. at 501.
246 Id. at 483.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 485.
249 Id. at 486.
250 Id. at 526.
251 Id. at 539.
252 See Barlow, supra note 242.
253 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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“indispensable.”254
Online vendors analyze buying preferences to suggest future, related
purchases.255 There is an electronic trail of when emails are sent and to whom
they are sent.256 Search engines collect inquiries and store them in case a user
needs to revisit an old search.257 The news applications on phones filter stories
and suggest new ones based on past interests.258 Home security cameras can be
monitored from cellphones; doors and windows to houses can be locked from a
smartphone.259
Professor Daniel Solove, an expert in the privacy field, considered the thirdparty doctrine to be “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital
age.”260 The abandonment of the third-party doctrine should be favored and
replaced with an approach that is neutral, regardless of the type of technology,
to eliminate uncertainty and confusion over whether society has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the presence of certain technologies. In theory, a new
approach should also allow the market to create new technologies and help
consumers fully understand the privacy implications of the devices they
purchase to permit informed decisions about using them. A new theory should
also preclude the need to prosecute the privacy concerns over every new
application, device, or company that maintains records about us.
As Justice Gorsuch explained in his dissent in Carpenter, the third-party
doctrine is woefully incapable of reconciling Fourth Amendment protections in
the modern age, stating, “Even our most private documents—those that, in other
eras, we would have locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside
on third-party servers.”261
The third-party doctrine should not apply with respect to certain technologies
because much of the information forfeited by individuals is completed on behalf
of their devices.262 To waive Fourth Amendment protections, the individual must
Id. at 2220 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Lisa Magloff, Examples of Targeted Advertising, CHRON,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/examples-targeted-advertising-10869.html (last visited Apr.
27, 2020).
256 Understanding Email Message Flow, from Sending to Delivery, SPARKPOST,
https://www.sparkpost.com/resources/email-explained/email-message-flow-sendingdelivery/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2020).
257 Magloff, supra note 255.
258 The Apple News App, APPLE SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202329
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
259 Can I Control My Home Security from My Phone?, SAFEWISE (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.safewise.com/home-security-faq/home-security-phone/.
260 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005).
261 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
262 See Solove, supra note 260, at 753 (explaining the lack of voluntariness of people and
254
255
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voluntarily provide information to a third party.263 However, many device users
do not voluntarily relinquish information; rather, when the devices are powered
on, information is sent on behalf of the individual to third parties.264 No
voluntary action triggers this collection, and warrantless government searches
conducted under the authority of the third-party doctrine should be
unconstitutional. Because this is similar to the reasoning in Carpenter, this data
collection should be given the same protections as CSLI.265
It is estimated that by 2027, forty-one billion IoT devices will be in use, up
from eight billion in 2019.266 This rapid expansion highlights the importance of
establishing protections for data held by third parties, rather than just protecting
CSLI.
IX. REVISITING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
An awareness of the text and history of the Fourth Amendment and an
understanding of modern technology is required for deciding privacy cases in
the digital age. The understanding of what areas are constitutionally protected
has grown to reflect changes in society and technology, with even originalist,
conservative judges willing to expand protections to cover modern
technologies.267 In his dissenting opinion in Carpenter, Judge Gorsuch
explained the importance of preserving the privacy that was intended since the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, stating that the Fourth Amendment must
protect “specific rights known at the founding” and also their “modern
analogues.”268
The modern definitions of “papers” and “effects” are very complex compared
to what the Framers had at the time of the Fourth Amendment. However, through
the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, one can see that they essentially
serve the same purpose; emails are modern letters,269 and computers are like file

the extensive data companies have that can be easily given to the government).
263 Smith v. Maryland, 462 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (explaining the voluntary
component of the third-party doctrine that waives Fourth Amendment protection).
264 See Josephine Wolf, Losing Our Fourth Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/28/opinion/fourth-amendment-privacy.html.
265 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
266 Peter Newman, THE INTERNET OF THINGS 2020: Here’s What Over 400 IoT
Decision-Makers Say About the Future of Enterprise Connectivity and How IoT Companies
Can Use It to Grow Revenue, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-report.
267 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“While the technology used in the
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”).
268 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2271 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
269 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
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cabinets.270 The computers and software that store our digital footprints hold
enormous amounts of data that could equal the massive amounts of data of the
“papers” and “effects” the Founders envisioned.271 Professor Davies, a wellknown privacy scholar, has stated:
In sum, although the evidence on this point is less than definitive, the
available linguistic and statutory evidence suggests that “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” was understood to provide clear
protection for houses, personal papers, the sorts of domestic and
personal items associated with houses, and even commercial
products or goods that might be stored in houses—while leaving
commercial premises and interests otherwise subject to
congressional discretion.272
The text of the Fourth Amendment expresses the “right to be secure” in one’s
person, house, papers, and effects; the Framers intended to preserve that liberty
against undue infringement, specifically state intrusion, by government officers
regardless of the inevitable shifting of cultural norms.273 Old-fashioned deposit
receipts have been replaced by a digital paper.274 When cars pass through a toll
booth, an electronic record is created that logs the location and time of the
passing.275 The modern equivalent of papers the Framers stored in their desks is
digital computer files.276 Due to the history and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, “papers” should be read as an expressive analog to the more
conventional, physical papers. This reading allows people to retain their
guaranteed constitutional rights while also recognizing the role of technology
and how it has altered the world. It is also necessary for this framework to work
along a continuum. Information that is freely shared with others, for example,
revealing comments left on public social media pages, deserves little to no
protection.277 Data that the user takes a concerted effort to restrict access to, data
270 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010) (“At bottom,
we conclude that the sheer amount of information contained on a computer does not
distinguish the authorized search of the computer from an analogous search of a file cabinet
containing a large number of documents.”).
271 Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It),
WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-datacollection/; Brady, supra note 27, at 981–83 (explaining the historical context and meaning
of the words “papers” and “effects”).
272 Davies, supra note 22, at 714.
273 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Davies, supra note 22, at 744–45.
274 Ferguson, supra note 155, at 598.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 598–99.
277 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,744–46 (1979) (explaining that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy to the information shared with others, thus, Fourth
Amendment protection does not apply). Most data collected by smart devices will not be in
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that contains deeply revealing information, or data that would typically be
covered under the Fourth Amendment should be protected. This is due to the
large amount of information that is held by third parties that, if shared, would
threaten to expose some of people’s innermost thoughts and questions, even
bordering on characteristics that one would only share with his or her private
diary or journal.
Under the existing doctrine, a gap exists in how to classify an “effect.” The
term “effects” has long been understood to extend to personal property;278 in
fact, the court has referenced objects such as automobiles279 and luggage280 as
“effects” throughout its history. Due to the digital age, many scholars have
suggested a broader reading of “effects” to cover computers, telephones, and
other storage devices.281 There is no reason why “effects” cannot be updated to
be consistent with Fourth Amendment principles, as it would include the smart
data, as well as signals emanating from the device.
The IoT offers new surveillance possibilities that do not require physical
intrusion, resulting in the possibility of increased government surveillance that
can reveal daily routines.282
The Fourth Amendment was not intended to define privacy; rather, like the
rest of the Constitution, it is meant to recognize the necessity of limiting the
government’s power and discretion.283 Despite new breakouts of technology, it
is crucial that the Fourth Amendment is reevaluated to provide for traditional
privacy limits because with current interpretations, the Fourth Amendment is
“plain view.” However, information readily shared online through a public forum, with no
additional skills or information required to access this information, will be an exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
278 Brady, supra note 27, at 982–83.
279 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (“Although vehicles are ‘effects’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.’ “ (quoting Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970))); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404
(2012).
280 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705–06 (1983); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 253 (1991) (“Luggage, handbags, paper bags, and other containers are common
repositories for one’s papers and effects, and the protection of these items from state
intrusion lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.”).
281 See Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of
Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 51 (2013) (“Portable devices like cell phones and flash drives are ‘effects’
subject to search and seizure like briefcases and backpacks.”); see also Richard Sobel et al.,
The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a
More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 8 (2013).
282 See Ferguson, supra note 143, at 810.
283 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (securing the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” of
American citizens against unlawful searches and seizures, and requiring specificity of
warrants based upon probable cause).
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ineffective against certain government intrusions.
A. Technology or Privacy: Do You Have to Choose Just One?
Often, many people explain away their privacy by stating they have “nothing
to hide,” and because they are not doing anything wrong, they need not worry
about the government having access to their information.284 These explanations
are known, respectively, as Nothing to Hide and All-or-Nothing.
1. Nothing to Hide
When discussing data privacy and technology, many people respond by
saying they have nothing to hide. Variations of this argument include:
1. If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.285
2. “Like I said, I have nothing to hide. The majority of the American people have
nothing to hide. And those that have something to hide should be found out, and
get what they have coming to them.”286
3. “Do I care if the FBI monitors my phone calls? I have nothing to hide. Neither
does 99.99 percent of the population. If the wiretapping stops one of these Sept.
11 incidents, thousands of lives are saved.”287
The issue with this line of reasoning is that it assumes everything should be
public knowledge because nothing can be used against you. One journalist in
Time asserted: “The more I learned about data-mining, the less concerned I was.
Sure, I was surprised that all these companies are actually keeping permanent
files on me. But I don’t think they will do anything with them that does me any
harm”; he further stated he was not worried because no human being ever reads
the files.288 This line of thinking is dangerous for two reasons: first, it fails to
consider that some information may be perceived by government officials to be
a pattern of criminal behavior, thereby giving the government a valid reason to
monitor for criminal activity; second, these individuals sacrifice the rights of
others because they do not care what happens to them.289 Furthermore,
individuals could read the files if they chose to, and, if a person was ever

SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 21.
Daniel J. Solove, ‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 747 (2007).
286 Id. at 749.
287 Id.
288 Witte, supra note 197, at 738–39.
289 SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 18 (discussing the use of governmental data mining for
finding patterns to determine who is behaving suspiciously enough to warrant further
government surveillance).
284
285
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implicated in a crime, the government could seize the files and easily read about
the person’s whereabouts going back decades.290
Overall, this mindset leads to negative results, as it assists in the slow erosion
of privacy rights over time.291 For example, say the government begins to record
telephone conversations arbitrarily. The individuals who support the nothing to
hide theory may shrug their shoulders and brush the records off as minimal or
non-invasive because the telephone conversation recordings are not widespread
and, according to them, may cause at least one crime to be solved. To them, the
benefits outweigh the risks. Alternatively, say the government begins
monitoring some people’s credit card statements in hopes of finding suspicious
purchases. The individuals have not been flagged for suspicious purchases;
rather the decision on who to monitor is pure chance. They may claim the
government does not want to cause harm, which may be true, but the release of
records may cause inadvertent harm. The more people who have access to the
records, the more of a chance they will be leaked or the wrong person will gain
access to them.292 At first blush, these two examples may sound gradual but after
a while, the government will have collected information on every American.
What if the government takes this information and infers criminal activity?
2. All or Nothing
Privacy and national security need not be mutually exclusive; surrendering
privacy does not necessarily make citizens more secure, but surrendering
security does not necessarily equate to an erosion of Fourth Amendment
rights.293 It is possible to allow for government oversight with “a degree of
limitation” because the Fourth Amendment works through judicial oversight.294
This framework does not account for the nuances of technology. What if one
wants to use Amazon Alexa to help organize his or her day, but this individual
does not want it to provide his or her daily activities to the government freely?
Currently, there are no provisions in place that would allow a person to
accomplish this, other than not purchasing an Alexa (or other technology), due
to the implementation and analysis of the third-party doctrine.295
Witte, supra note 197, at 739.
SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 12.
292 See Solove, supra note 285, at 768–69.
293 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 2 (“The privacy-security debate profoundly
influences how these government activities are regulated . . . [these] arguments, however,
are based on mistaken views about what it means to protect privacy and the costs and
benefits of doing so.”).
294 See id. at 4.
295 See generally THOMPSON II, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that the courts have long
recognized a sweeping third-party doctrine where information willingly turned over to a
third party is not subject to the same level of protection as other personal items).
290
291
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This all or nothing mindset encompasses the third-party doctrine as it relates
to technology not considered in Carpenter. Concerning CSLI and privacy cases
that came before it, the All or Nothing Framework is better classified as Mostly
All or Nothing.
X. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The Supreme Court is likely to address privacy jurisprudence, and new
technologies, using the same piecemeal, incremental approach that has plagued
old-fashioned common law.296 The court has been reluctant to decide more than
what stands before it, probably because judges do not feel they are able to fully
understand contemporary technology or society’s increasing desire to
incorporate technology into daily routines.297 Because this is the same judicial
process that has brought us through Carpenter, it is imperative that society
encourage private businesses or the legislature to step in and acknowledge
privacy rights. To incentivize companies to safeguard consumers’ privacy, it
must first be “valued by consumers as a commodity in its own right, much like
organic foods have become a valued food type.”298
Companies should be responsible for safely collecting and transferring data,
whether through the use of encryption on behalf of the company or partnerships
with the government to encourage transparency.299 The technology giants, such
as Apple and Microsoft, should also stand up against governmental intrusion on
behalf of their customers.300 Consumers rely on them to protect their interests
because the government can and will request consumers’ data from them.301
A. Encryption
Encryption is “the process of encoding information such that a key is required
to decode it.”302 Encryption helps keep information secret from anyone who is
not intended to have access to it through the use of a decryption key. 303
See id. at 25–26.
See id. at 26.
298 Friedland, supra note 138, at 912.
299 See Security Breach – How Businesses May Be Liable, HG LEGAL RESOURCES,
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/security-breach-how-businesses-may-be-liable-44358 (last
visited Apr. 29, 2020).
300 Riana Pfefferkorn, Everything Radiates: Does the Fourth Amendment Regulate SideChannel Cryptanalysis?, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1393, 1405–06 (2017).
301 Id. at 1407–08.
302 David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2217 (2009).
303 Pfefferkorn, supra note 300, at 1396; What is Encryption? Types of Encryption,
296
297
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Encryption prevents the government, or anyone else, from gaining access to
personal files and communications.304 Currently, encryption provides a safe
environment for internet and institutional commerce; so, it is not far off to
assume that wider deployment of encryption to the public might be possible in
the future.305 This type of personal encryption would negatively impact law
enforcement because encryption “makes it impossible, irrespective of warrants,
for law enforcement to recover” the previously encrypted information.306
One privacy scholar contends that encryption to protect against a cyberintrusion is analogous to physical locks, bolts, and alarms in a physical
intrusion.307 When encryption is afforded by companies, rather than individual
consumers, the companies may provide discretionary access to the government
as they have the keys to decrypt.308 For example, WhatsApp offers end-to-end
encryption for messages, voice calls, and videos.309 Nevertheless, WhatsApp
communication metadata is generally available to law enforcement, if
required.310
In contrast, Apple has shown its unwillingness to support the government,
despite its privacy policy.311 Most notably, Apple would not create a backdoor
for the encrypted cellphone of a deceased terrorist, Syed Farook in San
Bernardino.312 Apple was ordered by a federal magistrate judge to provide a
backdoor to the government to allow federal investigators to determine if the
terrorist was working alone.313 Apple denied this request, asserting its
commitment to ensuring the privacy of its millions of customers.314 In the end,
the government hacked the terrorist’s phone without Apple’s assistance.315
However, this is not to say that Apple never hands over data to the government;
in fact, Apple can and does disclose iCloud data to law enforcement.316 The

CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-is-encryption/ (last visited Apr.
29, 2020).
304 Pfefferkorn, supra note 300, at 1396.
305 Lin, supra note 214, at 1095–96.
306 Id. at 1096.
307 Couillard, supra note 302, at 2225 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 721 (4th ed. 2004)).
308 There Is No Middle Ground on Encryption, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 2,
2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/there-no-middle-ground-encryption.
309 Pfefferkorn, supra note 300, at 1404.
310 Id. at 1411–12.
311 See Welcome to iCloud, supra note 204.
312 Apple Still Doesn’t Know How FBI Hacked San Bernardino Terrorist’s iPhone
Without Their Help, FOX NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/apple-stilldoesnt-know-how-fbi-hacked-san-bernardino-terrorists-iphone-without-their-help.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Pfefferkorn, supra note 300, at 1412–13.
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difference, theoretically, between these two cases is that in the terrorist attack,
by providing the backdoor to the terrorist’s phone, the government could
conceivably hack all iPhone users with the touch of a button, whereas with the
iCloud, the government must contact Apple in order to retrieve the
information.317 It may also be possible that the market will encourage individuals
to better protect their privacy. As two technology advocates, Gershenfeld and
Vasseur, concluded:
By extending cryptography down to the level of individual devices,
the owners of those devices would gain a new kind of control over
their personal information. Rather than maintaining secrecy as an
absolute good, it could be priced based on the value of sharing. Users
could set up a firewall to keep private the Internet traffic coming from
the things in their homes—or they could share that data with, for
example, a utility that gave a discount for their operating their
dishwasher only during off-peak hours or a health insurance provider
that offered lower rates in return for their making healthier lifestyle
choices.318
This suggestion allows consumers to choose whether they want to participate in
the IoT, giving them the privacy many individuals desire while also allowing
them to stay connected.
B. Right to be Forgotten
Many legal scholars have suggested a “right to be forgotten” law, which draws
its support and history from European countries.319 This law is intended to secure
private information for private individuals, as it allows individuals to have
certain information deleted from search engines or places where internet records
are stored.320 It strives to balance data protection and the right of privacy with
the public’s interest in access to the information.321 Critics contend that if a
similar “right to be forgotten” law is adopted by Americans, there would be

317 See generally Thomas Brewster, The Feds Can Now (Probably) Unlock Every iPhone
Model in Existence, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2018/02/26/government-can-access-any-apple-iphone-cellebrite/#3f4dcb37667a (discussing
the U.S. government’s ability to access data on iPhone models).
318 Neil Gershenfeld & J. P. Vasseur, As Objects Go Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls)
of the Internet of Things, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 60, 67.
319 John W. Dowdell, An American Right to Be Forgotten, 52 TULSA L. REV. 311, 314
(2017).
320 Id. at 321.
321 Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to Be Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014, 4:37 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/05/the-european-right-to-be-forgotten-is-just-whatthe-internet-needs.html.
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profound impacts on the First Amendment Constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.322 They claim it would be antithetical to one of
the nation’s founding principles: the free flow of information; they claim it
amounts to censorship.323 Secondly, critics argue that to allow private companies
to remove certain information puts corporations in charge of enforcing privacy
rights, thereby becoming the ones in charge of enforcing the balance between
free speech and privacy.324 On the other hand, supporters of a right to be
forgotten law in the United States say it will allow individuals to better control
their personal data.325 They argue that much of the information online can be
used to damage individuals and their respective futures.326
Currently, there are laws that cover many aspects of personal privacy in
transactions, but they are not as encompassing as the right to be forgotten. Two
examples include the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) and the ECPA.327 Both of these acts regulate the use of personal
information.328
C. Congressional Interception
An essential feature of society is the relationship between humans and the
government; specifically, the checks and balances system enacted through the
founding documents and the nature of the Republic. Individuals should be more
vigilant about what information they disclose.329 However, new developments
in technology continue to maximize third-party disclosures.330 Congress has the
opportunity to craft legislation, with the Constitution in mind, that is amicable
to law enforcement and the public, unlike the judiciary which can only rule on
cases and laws that come before it.331
Consumers could benefit from federal privacy legislation as this would at
See Dowdell, supra note 319, at 334.
May Crockett, Comment, The Internet (Never) Forgets, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
151, 174 (2016).
324 See generally id. at 178 (discussing the right to be forgotten and posing the question
of companies like Google enforcing individual privacy rights).
325 Id. at 174.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 171.
328 Id.
329 What Can You Do to Protect Your Data Online?, FORBES (May 7, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/05/07/what-can-you-do-to-protect-your-dataonline/#1ba05dee68e2.
330 LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE FATE OF ONLINE TRUST IN
THE NEXT DECADE 51 (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/08/10/theme-3trust-will-not-grow-but-technology-usage-will-continue-to-rise-as-a-new-normal-sets-in/.
331 SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44967, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER
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least present a baseline that all companies would follow.332 As long as this
baseline has consequences for those who do not comply, it would allow for
nearly all companies to play by the same rules because the internet and other
online devices cross state lines.333 The legislation should be broad enough to
account for rapidly changing technology, but narrow enough to ensure data
security and privacy.334 Furthermore, if companies wanted to take additional
precautions to protect privacy, they should be welcome to do so under this new
law.335
XI. CONCLUSION
The digital transition from physical papers and the well-known concept of
“effects” represents a dangerous time for citizens’ civil liberties. The
enumeration of the Fourth Amendment protections reflects the Founders’
commitment to the development of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. It is necessary
that the Fourth Amendment is read to apply to all digital information, as a
functional equivalent to the physical papers and effects that existed during the
time of the Founding Fathers, if the United States is to preserve the right to
privacy for future generations. The Founding Fathers could not have ever
imagined the progression of technology, but their ideas and the foundation for
the Fourth Amendment protecting certain things remains the same.
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding privacy has been plentiful, but the
court’s decisions have focused on the devices rather than focusing on the types
of information collected by devices in general. The cornerstone for many of
these decisions has been the Fourth Amendment concept of reasonableness, but
what is reasonable with respect to electronic data is neither clear nor consistent.
As smart devices and internet tracking become even more prevalent, there is an
urgent need to retire the third-party doctrine and reconsider the outdated nature
of the SCA. Carpenter was a step in the right direction for CSLI, but it did not
consider the vast array of technologies and the methods of data collection yet to
emerge.
Americans must ensure the rights that were guaranteed by the Constitution at
the time of founding are still applicable for digitization, regardless of the new
332 Jack Karston, How Should the US Legislate Privacy?, BROOKINGS (July 30, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/30/how-should-the-us-legislate-dataprivacy/.
333 Id.
334 Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to
Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/whyprotecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/.
335 RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 330.

2020]

Protecting Online Privacy in the Digital Age

131

technologies that develop in the IoT. The Constitution may have been written a
long time before cellphones and the internet were devised, but its beliefs of
personal autonomy and privacy are unwavering.
Today, most of the information is stored on third-party servers; if this
information can be obtained without a warrant, Fourth Amendment privacy
protections are meaningless. If the third-party doctrine, as it stands, were to be
applied to the IoT, the government would be given unlimited access to an
individual’s personal information as part of a comprehensive IoT profile.
In Carpenter, the court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the data
collected by cellphones, but this narrow interpretation only creates more
questions than it answers. The smart home will soon be as much of a necessity
to modern life as cellphones. The eroding roots of voluntary conveyance and
assumption of risk of the third-party doctrine require a re-examination of the
doctrine.
Consumers should be encouraged to care about their privacy and advocate to
private businesses the importance of privacy. If lawmakers want to be involved,
they should develop a comprehensive, timeless protocol to guide law
enforcement in digital searches.
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